Admissibility of Evidence in Mass. DUI Cases

Commonwealth. v. Boothby, 64 Mass. App. Ct. 582 (2005)

Mansfield police Officer Paul Whitty arrested Shauna Boothby for DUI after responding to a single-car rollover accident on Route 106 in Mansfield. Officer Whitty found 3 people at the scene. One of the 3 people, Brandon Travis proactively informed Officer Whitty that he was driving. After conducting field sobriety tests on Travis, Officer Whitty arrested him for DUI. Then, Shauna Boothby told Officer Whitty that she was driving. She also failed field sobriety tests. 

Officer Whitty then asked the 3rd person at the scene who was driving. He stated that he was "90% sure" that Shauna Boothby was driving. 
Operation is a required element of DUI in Massachusetts and the prosecution could not obtain a DUI conviction on Boothby's statement alone. It would need to present some evidence to corroborate her admission. Here, the corroboration came from the 3rd person's statement that he was "90% sure" that Boothby was driving. 

Boothby's DUI lawyer should have objected to the statement on the grounds that it was inadmissible hearsay. It was ineffective assistance of counsel not to have objected to that out of court statement which was offered for the truth of the matter. Therefore, Boothby's conviction for OUI must be reversed and the guilty verdict set aside.

Commonwealth v. Dube, 413 Mass. 570 (1992)

Dube was involved in a single car accident in Gardner, Massachusetts. The police responded and he was transported to Heywood Hospital for medical treatment of his injuries. The police believed that Dube was driving under the influence of liquor. When Dube arrived at the hospital, as part of standard medical protocol, medical personnel drew blood from Dube and it was tested for alcohol content. 

Citing confidentiality and privacy concerns, Dube’s DWI lawyer attempted to block admission of the medical records. The Mass. SJC rejected Dube’s claim and ruled that the hospital blood alcohol records were admissible at trial pursuant to G.L. c. 233, § 79.

Commonwealth v. Howe, 405 Mass. 332 (1989)

The term "chain of custody" refers to the process of documenting the location of evidence from the time it is collected until the time it is used in a DWI or other trial. 

Here, the court held that the failure to show the "chain of custody" of blood samples reflecting the OUI defendant's blood alcohol concentration did not render the BAC evidence inadmissible. Instead, the failure to demonstrate chain of custody would go to the weight of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Mahoney, 400 Mass. 524 (1987)

Videotapes and other electronic recordings of DWI bookings and other aspects of the case are admissible as evidence, so long as they fairly depict that which they purport to depict and they are not the product of an illegal search or seizure.

Commonwealth v. Monahan, 349 Mass. 139, 170 (1965)

Prosecuting attorneys in Mass. DWI cases often attempt to introduce medical records to prove that the person charged with OUI drove at or above the legal limit of .08. These records can be introduced when a proper foundation is laid and the records are properly authenticated. However, the witness who provides this foundational testimony does not have to be the custodian of the records or the keeper of the records.

Commonwealth v. McGrail, 80 Mass. App. Ct. 339 (2011).  

In this Mass. operating under the influence, the Mass. Appeals Court upheld the denial of the drunk driving defendant’s motion to suppress the statement which he gave to the police while questioned at a hospital, because he was not in police custody at the time but rather in an unsecured area and being held by medical personnel for medical treatment purposes, due to the severity of his injuries following a motor vehicle crash. Although he was suspected of driving while under the influence, the Court ruled that the questioning was not custodial in nature.

Commonwealth v. Sheldon, 423 Mass. 373 (1996)

In Massachusetts drunk driving prosecutions, the Commonwealth can use hospital records to show the defendant’s blood alcohol level. However, for such medical records to be introduced, G.L. c. 233 § 79 requires the Commonwealth to establish that the records were maintained as part of the DUI defendant’s medical history and generated in connection with medical treatment. These requirements apply only when the Commonwealth attempts to introduce the blood alcohol records without live testimony of medical or laboratory personnel.  These records are considered "business records" and their use at trial does not trigger Melendez-Diaz concerns.

Commonwealth v. Southworth, 72 Mass. App. Ct. 1104 (2008)

In a Massachusetts DUI trial, bar or restaurant receipts showing alcohol purchased by the person accused of driving under the influence are admissible at trial, when the receipts tend to show alcoholic beverages being purchased shortly prior to the alleged time of operation. Evidence showing the purchase of intoxicating liquor would support the prosecution's theory of the case that the defendant drove while under the influence.

Commonwealth v. Sudderth, 37 Mass. App. Ct. 317, 321 (1994)

In a Mass. drunk driving trial, lay witnesses are generally restricted to testifying about facts and not their opinions. However, this rule is not without exception. For example, a police officer's opinion, based on observations that a DUI suspect used obscenities and was "was unsteady on his feet and smelled of alcohol," was admissible with respect to the question of whether or not the defendant was under the influence.

Hallet v. Rimer, 329 Mass. 61 (1952)

In this civil case, the plaintiff had no direct evidence that the defendant had consumed more than 2 drinks. However, he admitted that he had "one too many." In making this statement, he was essentially admitting that he was driving while under the influence. This statement was admissible.

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